Secrets, hostages and ransoms : British kidnap policy in historical perspective by Aldrich, Richard J. & Herrington, Lewis
  
 
 
 
warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications 
 
 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Aldrich, Richard J. and Herrington, Lewis (2018) Secrets, hostages and ransoms : British 
kidnap policy in historical perspective. Review of International Studies . 
doi:10.1017/S0260210518000098 
 
Permanent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/99106                      
 
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions.  Copyright © 
and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual 
author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  To the extent reasonable and practicable the 
material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before being made 
available. 
 
Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge.  Provided that the authors, title and full 
bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata 
page and the content is not changed in any way. 
 
Publisher’s statement: 
This article has been published in a revised form in Review of International Studies. 
doi:10.1017/S0260210518000098  . This version is free to view and download for private 
research and study only. Not for re-distribution, re-sale or use in derivative works. 
© British International Studies Association 2018 
 
A note on versions: 
The version presented here may differ from the published version or, version of record, if 
you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher’s version.  Please see the 
‘permanent WRAP url’ above for details on accessing the published version and note that 
access may require a subscription 
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk 
 
  
Secrets, Hostages and Ransoms: British Kidnap Policy in Historical Perspective 
 
Richard J. Aldrich and Lewis Herrington 
 
Abstract: Britain has long taken a firm public line against terrorist ransom, insisting that 
yielding to terrorist demands only encourages further acts of intimidation and kidnapping. 
Hitherto, academic research has tended to take these assertions of piety at face value. This 
article uses a historical approach to show that the British position has shifted over time and 
was often more complex and pragmatic. Indeed, Britain’s position with regard to kidnap and 
ransom insurance has, until quite recently, been rather ambiguous. We use the British case to 
suggest that, rather than dividing states into groups that make concessions and those that do 
not, it is perhaps better to recognise there is often a broad spectrum of positions, sometimes 
held by different parts of the same government, together with the private security companies 
that move in the shadows on their behalf. One of the few things that unites them is a tendency 
to dissemble and this presents some intriguing methods problems for researchers. 
 
Disagreement and Denial 
The cost of kidnapping for ransom (KfR) is on the rise. In May 2017, Qatar was alleged to have 
paid $1bn to an al-Qaeda affiliate group associated with Iran for the release of a group abducted 
in Iraq. While in 2003, the typical sum sought for the release of kidnapped Western nationals 
was $200,000, now it is not uncommon to demand $10 million for a single hostage.1 
Kidnapping, hostage-taking and demands for ransoms have become a scourge of the modern 
state. In regions where economies have been badly disrupted by insurgency and civil war, 
                                                 
1 Erika Solomon, ‘The $1bn hostage deal that enraged Qatar’s Gulf rivals’, Financial Times, (5 June 2017). 
 2 
kidnapping foreigners for ransom has emerged as a lucrative industry for both criminal and 
terrorist enterprises. Moreover, despite UN resolutions agreed in public that forbid the paying 
of ransoms, in private there is little agreement on how to address this troubling issue. In reality, 
the positions of developed states in North America and Europe range from a robust refusal to 
negotiate mixed with retaliation through to calculated concession and even complete 
capitulation.2 
 
Following the invasion of Iraq in 2003, British and American resolve would be put to the test 
when three of their citizens, Kenneth Bigley, Eugene Armstrong and Jack Hensley were taken 
hostage by Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).3 Nine days earlier in the same district of Baghdad known 
as Al-Mansour, Italian aid workers Simona Pari and Simona Torretta were also taken. These 
kidnappings added five new prisoners to the growing number of Westerners held hostage in 
Iraq, including French journalists Christian Chesnot and Georges Malbrunot.4  
                                                 
2 Extended studies of this subject are rare, but see, Ann Auerbach, Ransom: The Untold Story of International 
Kidnapping (New York: Henry Holt, 1998); Carol Edler Baumann, The Diplomatic Kidnappings: A 
Revolutionary Tactic of Urban Terrorism (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973); Rachel Briggs, The Kidnapping 
Business (London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 2001); John Griffiths, Hostage: The History, Facts & Reasoning 
Behind Hostage Taking (London: Andre Deutch, 2003); Guy Faure and William Zartman (eds) Negotiating with 
Terrorists: Strategy, Tactics, and Politics (London: Routledge 2010). 
3 Andy Whitaker, 2004. ‘The Family that Fought to the End for Their Man’, The Independent, (9 October 2004). 
4 Hostage research has tended to focus more on terrorist behaviour than upon state responses: J.J.F. Forest, 
‘Global trends in kidnapping by terrorist groups’,  Global Change, Peace & Security, 24:3 (2012), pp. 311-330; 
J.J.F. Forest, ‘Kidnapping by Terrorist Groups, 1970-2010: Is Ideological Orientation Relevant?’,  Crime & 
Delinquency, 58:5 (2012), pp. 769-797; T. Sandler & K. Gaibulloev, ‘Hostage Taking: Determinants of 
Terrorist Logistical and Negotiation Success’, Journal of Peace Research, 46:5 (2009), pp. 739-756; Margaret 
Wilson, ‘Towards a Model of Terrorist Behaviour in Hostage Taking Incidents’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 
 3 
 
While the British and American hostages were ultimately beheaded, the Italian and French 
hostages all returned home unharmed. Subsequently, the media reported widespread 
allegations that some governments either financed directly or at least facilitated ransom 
payments to secure their release.5 The contrasting fate of these seven hostages demonstrates an 
apparent disagreement, privately at least, between the United States and Britain on the one 
hand, and Germany, France, Italy and Spain on the other hand, regarding the strategic utility 
of paying ransom demands or making concessions.  
 
The transatlantic community has long been divided on the issue of terrorist ransom. At present. 
Britain and the United States publicly refuse to enter into any form of negotiations in order to 
secure the release of citizens kidnapped by ISIS. Moreover, UN Security Council resolution 
2133 (2014), prohibits states from ‘making funds, financial assets or economic resources 
available for the benefit of those involved in terrorist acts’.6 Notwithstanding this resolution, 
there have been credible reports in the media and also by MPs from opposition political parties, 
that France, Italy, Spain, Germany, Austria and Switzerland have all defied the resolution and 
                                                 
44:4 (2000), pp. 403-424; Minwoo Yun & Mitchell Roth, ‘Terrorist Hostage-Taking and Kidnapping: Using 
script theory to predict the fate of a hostage’ Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 31:8 (2008), pp. 736-748. 
5 Sophie Arie, ‘Italian Aid Workers Freed in Iraq’, The Guardian, (29 September 2004); David Wood, ‘France 
Did Not Pay Ransom For Hostages' Release’, The Guardian, (22 December 2004). 
6 ‘Security Council Adopts Resolution 2133 (2014), Calling Upon States to Keep Ransom Payments, Political 
Concessions From Benefiting Terrorist | Meetings Coverage And Press Releases’. 2016. Un.Org. 
http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11262.doc.htm. accessed 21 May 2017. 
 4 
made ransom payments to UN designated terrorist groups.7 Lyse Doucet, a correspondent for 
BBC News, investigated the fate of nineteen men held captive by the Islamic State between the 
period 2013 to 2014.8 Four of those released, an Italian, two Frenchman and a Dutchman, 
offered Doucet a comprehensive insight into daily life as a prisoner of the Islamic State. During 
interviews, two of the men discussed how near the end of their captivity, they were asked 
questions about their home life to which only they would know the answer. Such questions are 
commonly referred to as ‘proof of life’; they are used by negotiators to confirm that payment 
of a ransom will yield the desired outcome. Danish photographer Daniel Ottosen told the 
reporter, ‘I got my proof of life, then the German guy got his proof of life a few days later ... it 
was very clear that they were not negotiating for the Americans and the Brits’.9  
 
The payment of ransoms is clearly sensitive. The French and Italian governments did not admit 
to negotiating or facilitating ransom payments to ISIS. Following the unexpected release in 
April 2014 of French journalists held by ISIS, the French government were forced to 
categorically refute an article in German magazine Fabric, citing NATO sources in Brussels 
which claimed Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian personally transported $18m to Ankara 
for the exchange.10 Italy has faced similar accusations of conceding to terrorist demands. 
                                                 
7 Rukmini Callimachi, ‘Paying Ransoms, Europe Bankrolls Qaeda Terror’, New York Times, (29 July 2014); 
Kashmira Gander, ‘Isis Hostage Threat: Which Countries Pay Ransoms To Release Their’. The Independent, (3 
September 2014). 
8 ‘How Four Men Survived as Hostages of IS - BBC News,’ 20 April 2016, BBC News. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-36080991. accessed 19 May 2017. 
9 Ibid. 
10 ‘France Denies It Paid Ransom for Syria Reporters’, 26 April 2016. Reuters. 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-france-ransom-idUSBREA3P0FE20140426. accessed 2 May 
2017. 
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Following the release of two Italian aid workers, Foreign Minister Paolo Gentiloni, conceded 
that while the government was opposed to paying ransom payments, the priority ‘is always the 
protection of the lives and physical integrity of our fellow citizens’.11 According to the 
respected Al-Jazeera investigative unit, Italy fabricated a story in 2012 to explain the rescue of 
Bruno Pelizzari and Debbie Calitz captured by Somali pirates in 2011 and held for ransom.12 
When ransoms are paid by governments, freed hostages and their families are strongly 
discouraged from talking to the media and denials appear to be common, sometimes 
accompanied by false evidence trails. All this can present academic researchers with a 
significant challenge. 
 
These episodes suggest that KfR presents us with the potential problem of “under-reporting”. 
It has long been suspected that variations in press freedom has a distorting effect on research 
into issues such as the relationship between terrorism and regime type.13 Logically, it follows 
that instances where states make secret concessions but then seek to mislead the press about 
this also present KfR researchers with a significant problem. The dominant work in this area is 
ultimately dependent on databases derived from press reporting and media monitoring services. 
This article seeks to contribute to the existing literature by problematising previous 
                                                 
11 Nick Squires, ‘Furious Row in Italy Over “Ransom” For Aid Workers Held in Syria’, Telegraph, (16 January 
2015). 
12 Ewen MacAskill, Seumas Milne, and Clayton Swisher, ‘Italian Intelligence Lied About Hostage Rescue to 
Hide Ransom Payment,’ The Guardian, (8 October 2015). 
13 Konstantinos Drakos and Andreas Gofas, ‘The devil you know but are afraid to face: Underreporting bias and 
its distorting effects on the study of terrorism’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 50:5 (2006), pp.714-735. See 
also Andrew Silke,  ‘The devil you know: Continuing problems with research on terrorism’, Terrorism and 
Political Violence, 13:4 (2001), pp.1-14. 
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methodologies and taking a new historical approach. While historical materials can be episodic 
and present their own problems of anecdotalism, they raise awkward questions about 
quantitative methodologies. We argue that this field is one that requires closer inspection, not 
least because of the inter-play between academic research and real-world policy 
recommendations on KfR. 
 
 
 
Methods and Approaches 
In public at least, Britain has always taken a hard line against the venal politics of terrorist 
hostage-taking and ransom.14 As early as 17 July 1979, the Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington 
summed up what he called 'the policy pursued by successive British Governments' on 
kidnapping for ransom, emphasising that this was to do everything possible to save lives 'but 
without acceding to terrorists' demands'.15  On 7 July 2011, then Home Secretary Theresa May 
reaffirmed this, adding that ‘the payment of kidnap ransoms was against international law and 
served to bolster terrorist and criminal gangs’.16 This position was further hardened in 2015 
when the British government finally banned the provision of ransom insurance. The most 
recent academic research has tended to support the publicly declared British policy on hostages. 
In 2016, a large-scale quantitative study looking back over several decades, concluded that 
                                                 
14 Briggs sums this public position up well: ‘The UK government has developed a simple approach: no 
substantive concessions’ together with a commitment ‘not to be held to ransom by terrorists’, Briggs, The 
Kidnapping Business, p. 3. 
15 HL Deb 17 July 1979 vol. 401 c1414WA.   
16 ‘G6 Meeting: Madrid 30 June 2011 - Written Statements to Parliament - GOV.UK’. 30 June 2011. Gov.Uk. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/g6-meeting-madrid-30-june-2011. accessed 3 May 2017. 
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those countries that engaged in negotiations with terrorists only encouraged more kidnappings. 
Meanwhile, it was suggested that the US and the UK had not made concessions and suffered 
no increase in incidents.17 Earlier comparative work by Richard Clutterbuck has also argued 
that concessions by specific governments had often contributed to further targeting of those 
governments. On balance, he suggests taking a firm stand, together with improved personal 
protection, had provided better results when dealing with terrorist blackmail.18  
 
Yet this position does not command universal consensus. Navin Bapat, also using formal 
quantitative approaches, takes an alternative view. He argues that terrorists sometimes simply 
do not believe that states will not negotiate, even if they publicly profess a hard line. He 
suggests this is partly because between 1968 to 1991, some negotiation was undertaken in more 
than half of hostage-taking events across the world involving terrorists. Bapat argues that 
instead the key issue is the credibility of the terrorists as negotiators and the presence of state 
sponsors or state intermediaries to improve this.19 More generally, Peter Sederberg has argued 
that aversion to negotiation has stemmed partly from the dominance of either the ‘war model’ 
or the ‘rational actor’ model, adding that these approaches have masked the fact that a 
simplistic no concessions approach is an inefﬁcient strategy.20 
 
                                                 
17 P.T. Brandt, Justin George, and Todd Sandler, ‘Why Concessions Should Not Be Made to Terrorist 
Kidnappers’, European Journal of Political Economy, 44:1 (2016), pp. 41-52.  
18 Richard Clutterbuck, ‘Negotiating with terrorists’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 4:4 (1992), pp. 263-287. 
19 Navin Bapat, ‘State Bargaining with Transnational Terrorist Groups,’ International Studies Quarterly, 50:1 
(2006), p. 222. 
20 P.C. Sederberg, ‘Conciliation as Counter-Terrorist Strategy’, Journal of Peace Research, 32:3 (1995), pp. 
295-312. 
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Research on KfR is challenging and so it is not surprising that we have these divergent 
positions. Large-scale quantitative analysis of kidnapping and ransoms that looks at many 
states over long periods can be problematic in four respects. First, it tends to lump countries 
together that have in fact behaved differently over time, for example, Britain and the USA. 
Second, it tends to assume that these countries pursue the same policies consistently over long 
periods. Thirdly, quantitative studies, sometimes looking at hundreds of events, tend to draw 
their information from databases that use press sources, ignoring the possibility that states that 
claim robustness might actually be hiding some concessions. Fourthly, kidnapping is 
sometimes addressed by proxies and state-private networks that occlude the extent of 
government involvement.21  
 
There is also the problem of what actually qualifies as a concession. Bapat has suggested that 
there are in fact at least four types: Full capitulation, stalling with compromise, and the 
‘Bangkok solution’ where hostages are allowed to go free in return for amnesty, all represent 
forms of negotiation. Additionally, there is a fourth response labelled, ‘government double-
cross’ where the government pretends to negotiate but then stings the terrorists.22  We suggest 
that there are further variants where the government offers facilitation or encouragement to 
private groups or third parties while appearing to keep its distance. As this article suggests, 
                                                 
21 Andrew Silke, ‘Continuing problems with research on terrorism’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 13:4 
(2001), p. 2; A.P. Schmid and P. Fleming, 'Quantitative and qualitative aspects of kidnapping and hostage 
negotiation', in G. Faure & W. Zartman (eds), Negotiating with Terrorists: Strategy, Tactics, and Politics 
(London: Routledge, 2015), pp. 47-69. 
22 Bapat, ‘State Bargaining with Transnational Terrorist Groups,’ p. 222. 
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states can bounce from one option to another, or even pursue several options at once because 
of divisions between security bureaucrats.23  
 
Meanwhile, one of the interesting findings by contemporary historians over the last ten years 
is how often states have denied engaging in general negotiation and compromise with terrorists, 
even when it was central to their strategic process.24 The long British negotiations with the 
Provisional IRA, leading to the Good Friday agreement in 1998, are a prime example. 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the British government denied that talks were taking place. 
In fact, the Labour leader, Harold Wilson went undercover in Dublin to talk to the IRA 
personally as early as 1972. Thereafter, once he was prime minister, Secret Intelligence Service 
(MI6) officers were appointed as interlocutors and were regarded as having ambassadorial 
status, in other words, they were considered inviolable by the Republicans. Discussions 
through these channels continued into the early 1990s. However, in 1993 they were leaked and 
once they became public knowledge, there was denial and finger-pointing on all sides.25  
 
In a similar way, state responses to kidnapping and ransom demands by terrorists confront 
researchers with problems of under-reporting or even outright obfuscation. Under-reporting is 
a recognised general problem for researchers examining terrorism in across a range of different 
                                                 
23 ibid. 
24 See for example Clive Jones & Tore Petersen (eds) Israel's Clandestine Diplomacies (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013). 
25 Andrew Mumford, ‘Covert Peacemaking: Clandestine Negotiations and Backchannels with the Provisional 
IRA during the Early ‘Troubles’, 1972–76,’ Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 39:4 (2011), pp. 
633-648.  
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regime types.26 Indeed, states have gone to some lengths to control the narrative around terrorist 
incidents and clearly have their own nexus of influence with the press.27 Therefore, in a realm 
where states, terrorist and the families of hostages all have possible reasons to misrepresent the 
narrative, the data used in a broad survey may be over-simplistic. This article seeks to probe 
the scale of this problem by deploying a more historical approach: specifically, archival 
research twinned with freedom of information act requests.28 This method has been used 
successfully by other researchers examining recondite subjects such as torture, interrogation, 
surveillance and nuclear weapons programmes.29 
 
Historical approaches are not without their own problems. The cases that can be attacked in 
this way are necessarily small in number and may not be representative.30 Researchers have 
limited possibilities for case study selection and may find their investigation steered by what 
                                                 
26 Konstantinos Drakos and Andreas Gofas, ‘Evidence for the existence of under-reporting bias in observed 
terrorist activity: The message in press freedom status transitions’, Democracy and Security 3:2 (2007), pp.139-
155. 
27   Pippa Norris, Montague Kern, and Marion R. Just, (eds.) Framing terrorism: The news media, the 
government, and the public (London: Routledge, 2003). 
28 See for example: ‘Payment of ransom money for kidnapped British diplomats, 1976 Jan 01 - 1980 Dec 31’, 
T383/596, file obtained by authors under FOIA in 2016. 
29 For successful examples of this approach see: Geraint Hughes, ‘Skyjackers, jackals and soldiers: British 
planning for international terrorist incidents during the 1970s’, International Affairs, 90:5 (2014), pp. 1013-103; 
Rory Cormac, ‘Much Ado About Nothing: Terrorism, Intelligence, and the Mechanics of Threat Exaggeration.’ 
Terrorism and Political Violence, 25:3 (2013), pp. 476-493. 
30 Alon Confino, ‘Collective memory and cultural history: Problems of method,’ The American Historical 
Review, 102:5 (1997): 1386-1403. 
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is extant in the archives.31 Moreover, historians who work on resistant subjects such as state 
security policy have frequently warned us about the problem of the ‘laundered archive’, since 
states tend to be selective about what documents they declassify and release.32 But equally, 
officials find it difficult to redact or withdraw documents scattered across several departments 
or even countries and mistakes are common. Where governments have attempted to withhold 
or destroy large-scale archives, the sleight of hand is often visible to the researcher.33 Famously, 
two historians, David Anderson and Caroline Elkins, have overturned the widely held idea that 
the transfer of power in the late British Empire was a largely peaceful process, pointing to the 
ruthless deployment of violence and systemic torture.34 Their arguments were underpinned by 
the revelation that the British government had hidden thousands of files on many British 
overseas territories. The British government had created a veritable “gulag archipelago” of 
forbidden files at offices in Hanslope Park in Buckinghamshire where the material was illegally 
withheld. Their discovery and eventual release has reminded us that while governments invest 
a lot of time in controlling their own narrative, these efforts rarely stand the test of time.35     
                                                 
31 Cameron G. Thies, ‘A pragmatic guide to qualitative historical analysis in the study of international 
relations,’ International Studies Perspectives, 3:4 (2002): 351-372; Barbara Geddes, ‘How the cases you choose 
affect the answers you get: Selection bias in comparative politics,’ Political Analysis 2:1 (1990): 131-150. 
32 C.M. Andrew, ‘Secret Intelligence and British Foreign Policy 1900–1939,’ in Christopher Andrew, and 
Jeremy Noakes, (eds) Intelligence and International Relations, 1900-1945. No. 15. (Exeter: University of Exeter 
Press, 1987), p. 9. 
33 Caroline Elkins, ‘Looking beyond Mau Mau: Archiving Violence in the Era of Decolonization’, The 
American Historical Review, 120:3 (2015), pp. 852-868. 
34 David M. Anderson, ‘Guilty Secrets: Deceit, Denial, and the Discovery of Kenya’s “Migrated Archive”’, 
History Workshop Journal, 80:1 (2015), pp.142-60. 
35 P. Murphy, ‘Acceptable Levels? The Use and Threat of Violence in Central Africa, 1953–64’, in M.B. 
Jerónimo and A.C. Pinto (eds.) The Ends of European Colonial Empires (London: Palgrave, 2015). 
 12 
 
Moreover, there is some cause for epistemological optimism, since the nature of historical 
archives and evidence is changing, with more mass leaks by whistle-blowers creating sizeable 
online archives that are beyond government control and an increasing abundance of corporate 
and business archives that lie outside the purview of government repositories.36 More 
consideration needs to be given to research strategies for resistant subjects like terrorist ransom 
and negotiation with violent non-state actors generally.37 Although the cases that can be 
examined here are historic and limited in number, an analysis of newly declassified British 
government records reveals surprising disagreement between different elements of government 
over negotiation, and also the participation of state-private networks around kidnap insurance 
and specialist hostage advice. British officials took a permissive approach to these enterprises, 
noting that: 'Kidnap Ransom insurance is big business' and that London was 'the main world 
source'.38 These complexities mean that the reality of British policy has differed significantly 
over time and while publicly professing a consistent line, government has preferred private 
flexibility.  
 
 
                                                 
36 For example, US Embassy Addis Ababa to State Department, 000854,  'UK Seeks Continued Collaboration to 
Effect Release of Ethiopian Hostages', 19 March 2007, 16:27 (Monday) 
Https://Search.Wikileaks.Org/Plusd/Cables/07ADDISABABA854_A.Html accessed 3 March 2017. 
37 Harmonie Toros, ‘'We Don't Negotiate with Terrorists!': Legitimacy and Complexity in Terrorist Conflicts,’ 
Security Dialogue, 39:4 (2008), pp. 407-26; P.R. Neumann, ‘Negotiating with Terrorists’, Foreign Affairs, 86:1 
(2007), pp. 128-38.  
38 Harrington to Boys Smith, 'Home Secretary’s Visit to the United States: Kidnap and Ransom Insurance', and 
attached brief 'Points to Make', 21 May 1986, HO325/757. All archival references are to the UK National Archives 
(TNA) unless otherwise stated. 
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Britain’s historic policy of flexibility 
In the mid-1960s, beginning with the first Harold Wilson administration, Britain developed 
policies designed to discourage terrorist groups from taking British hostages.39 Despite this, 
with the numbers of terrorist kidnappings increasing, especially in the Middle East and Latin 
America, Whitehall officials accepted that it was only a matter of time before they faced their 
own hostage crisis.40 Early in 1970, two unpleasant cases focused their minds: the execution 
of Dan Mitrione, a senior CIA counter-insurgency advisor in Uruguay, who was killed by the 
Tupamaros terrorist group, followed by the execution of Karl Maria von Spreti, the German 
ambassador in Guatemala.41 In both cases, the host country where the event had occurred 
resisted the idea of negotiation with the terrorists and this fact resonated strongly with 
London.42 Accordingly, during this period of increasing terrorist activity, Britain sought to 
combine a public show of firmness with a degree of private flexibility and concession.  
 
The key figure promoting this flexible policy was Edward Heath, British Prime Minister 
between 1970 and 1974. Heath occupied Downing Street during an upsurge in terrorism, 
kidnapping and assassination, some of which spilled out onto London’s streets. Heath himself 
was a target and faced pipe-bombs in Sidcup planted by the Angry Brigade.43 Most famously, 
in 1970, Heath steered British policy towards negotiation and compromise, with his refusal to 
                                                 
39 ‘Anglo-French Information Talks – Background Notes’, 27/28 October 1975, FCO26/1694. 
40 The Global Terrorism Database shows an increase from 50 per year in 1970 to 250 per year in 1980. 
41 Richard P. Wright, Kidnap for Ransom: Resolving the Unthinkable (New York: CRC, 2009) p. 21. 
42 Ibid. In 1971, there was even a credible kidnap threat against the British ambassador in Cuba, Sykes to Hunter, 
19 May 1971, FCO7/1985. 
43 Cormac, ‘Much Ado About Nothing’, p. 478. 
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extradite the PLFP terrorist Leila Khaled to Israel after the hijacking of several aircraft at 
Dawson’s Field in the Jordanian desert.44 Heath faced strong resistance from the United States 
on this issue. Co-ordinating his action through the Berne Group, a club of European security 
services, Heath handed over Khaled and six other PLFP members were freed from jails in 
Germany and Switzerland to secure the release of British hostages held on three airliners.45   
 
While the Leila Khaled episode in 1970 and other hi-jackings were regarded as one-off 
spectaculars that involved threats to blow-up aircraft and their passengers, these were 
accompanied by a series of individual kidnaps that focused on drawn-out bargaining over the 
release of imprisoned terrorists, monetary demands, publicity for manifestos or merely safe 
passage for kidnappers. In particular, the early 1970s witnessed the rise of Marxist groups 
influenced by Carlos Marighela in Brazil who preached the concept that the urban guerrilla 
should attack banks and businesses to resource their activities. The kidnapping of foreigners 
(perceived as imperialist criminals) for ransom became a lucrative means by which to fund 
their operations. These individual cases were also brought to the door of Downing Street for 
decision.46 
 
Latin America saw a positive plague of diplomatic kidnapping. In London, despairing officials 
felt that there was no solution other than the complete closure of missions or their truncation 
                                                 
44 E. Heath, The Course of My Life (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1988), p. 323; John Campbell, Edward 
Heath: A Biography (London: Cape, 1993), p. 308. 
45 Douglas-Home to Freemen, 7 September 1970, PREM15/201; Cabinet Minutes, 9 September 1970, 
CAB127/47. 
46 Peter Day, ‘Heath's Secret Deal to Free Ambassador’, Telegraph, (1 January 2002).  
 15 
into ‘fortresses’.47 In early 1970, alongside the events in Uruguay and Guatemala, Paraguayan 
and Russian diplomats had been kidnapped by Argentine terrorists, together with an attack on 
the Syrian embassy in Buenos Aires. The Argentine government boasted a hard-line and 
declared a policy of no deals, no ransoms and no prisoner release. The president of Paraguay 
was no less phlegmatic about the capture of one of his compatriots - he continued with his 
fishing holiday during the episode - and remarked to colleagues that the life of one Paraguayan 
diplomat ‘did not matter’.48 This lack of interest on the part of local governments in the fate of 
kidnapped diplomats worried westerners. Britain joined other European countries in privately 
opposing hard-line ‘non-negotiation’ declarations at both an international and a regional 
level.49  In short, by mid-1970, Britain had already developed a policy of encouraging discreet 
negotiation, even before it was put to the test. The three case studies that follow, chosen because 
their development can be documented in detail, demonstrate how flexible British government 
policy became in the 1970s and the attendant rationales advanced for this. 
 
 
 
James Cross, 1970 
On 5 October 1970, James Cross, the British trade commissioner in Montreal was kidnapped 
by the Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ).50 He was selected for kidnap from a number of 
                                                 
47 Wiggin to Haddow, 9 September 1970, FCO7/1478. 
48 Macdermot to Wiggin, 10 April 1970, ibid. 
49 Haddow, the British ambassador in Buenos Aires, thought that if the American ambassador was kidnapped and 
the demands were reasonable, the Argentinians 'could be persuaded to do a discreet deal', Haddow to Wiggin, 
‘Kidnapping’, 27 August 1970, ibid. 
50 Day to Wiggin, ‘Kidnaping of Mr J.R. Cross’, 5 October 1970, FCO7/1763. 
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British diplomats because his movements were the most routine. They knew that at precisely 
7.15 am he was always in the shower. Abducted from his house early in the morning, he was 
made to wear a blacked-out gas mask and lie on the floor of a taxi. The FLQ then issued an 
improbable list of demands: a halt to ongoing police searches, the publicising of the FLQ 
manifesto, $500,000 in gold, freedom for twenty-three FLQ prisoners and their safe passage 
abroad. They also demanded that the identity of an informer who recently betrayed a FLQ cell 
should be made public.51  
 
In Britain, the new Edward Heath government considered this matter at Cabinet level. The 
Foreign Secretary, Alec Douglas-Home, denounced the FLQ as ‘a group of murderous and 
extreme left wing thugs’ and did not wish to give them any quarter.52 Addressing the Cabinet 
on 6 October, he argued that, for the time being, they should avoid any public pronouncement 
other than saying they deferred to the Canadians. But privately he argued for a hard line, 
insisting that, at the right moment, they should consider following the American example and 
announce publicly that in any future cases, they would not be prepared to press other 
governments to accept demands, even in the cause of saving human life. Not all his Cabinet 
colleagues agreed with this position.53 
 
In fact, the Canadian government had already adopted a staunch public position of non-
negotiation and had advertised it widely. On 8 October 1970, the FLQ responded by 
announcing to the Canadian press that ‘in the face of the Government’s refusal to negotiate 
Cross had been liquidated’. The Montreal police were told that they would find a blood-stained 
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revolver and the abandoned body of James Cross at a certain location, but in fact the police 
only found a blood-stained revolver. Instead, Cross remained alive and was held for two 
months before his release was secured after negotiations and compromises that were long in 
the preparation and short in the execution.54 
 
Negotiations occurred partly because Douglas-Home’s officials in the Foreign Office did not 
agree with his hard line. This included Denis Greenhill, his most senior official who had already 
taken the lead on the Khaled case. Conveniently, there was considerable pressure to do a deal 
from the First Division Association, the body that represented the employment rights of senior 
civil servants. This was helpful to Greenhill, for he was then able to telephone his opposite 
numbers in Ottawa repeatedly, relaying this pressure, while explaining that this was not 
actually coming directly from the British government.55 Cross was, in fact, a Board of Trade 
official seconded to the Foreign Office and senior figures in his former department complained 
that the diplomats were not doing enough to get their man released.56 Britain’s High 
Commissioner in Ottawa also felt under pressure and wanted the MI5 liaison officer from 
Washington permanently attached to the Canadian Police Task Force in Montreal that was 
hunting the kidnappers. He accepted that this would not help in any meaningful way, but 
explained that this was ‘to protect ministers’ from mounting criticism that they were not doing 
enough.57 
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Deals were already being explored. As early as 7 October, the British and the Canadians were 
working together to facilitate safe asylum for the kidnappers and also for any FLQ prisoners 
that might be released. The two possible destinations that the FLQ had identified in their 
ultimatum were Cuba or Algeria. Ottawa was keen to make a secret approach to Algiers and 
Havana but ‘without creating the impression that they were prepared to do a deal with the 
terrorists’. Rather than asking outright, they instructed their representatives in Havana to 
‘quietly’ draw attention to the fact the FLQ were interested in asylum, and then sent someone 
to Algiers to do the same thing. London emphasised ‘it is important that if anyone learns of 
these approaches the Canadians should be able to say that they were simply drawing attention 
to references to Cuba and Algeria that have been made public here’, adding that they should 
‘not admit’ that Ottawa was hoping for assistance with negotiations.58 By 15 October, 
emissaries in both Havana and Algiers, were preparing to undertake negotiations for the 
transfer of 25 FLQ members on the basis that the hosts would be offered $1,000 per head as a 
maintenance payment.59 
 
Neither the Algerian nor the Cuban government were keen to receive the FLQ terrorists, 
nevertheless Havana agreed, citing reasons of compassion rather than ideological solidarity. 
Some of the Cuban diplomats who assisted were also personal friends of Cross.60 The Quebec 
government then offered release for 5 of the 23 prisoners and their safe passage to Cuba, 
together with the kidnappers. The next day, angered by the partial response, the FLQ kidnapped 
Quebec's Minister for Labour, Pierre Laporte and then, when new emergency measures were 
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introduced, strangled him and left his body in the trunk of a car. Contact with the FLQ dwindled 
during November and both Ottawa and London were now pessimistic about recovering Cross 
alive.61   
 
However, the police continued their searches. On 2 December, they uncovered the safe house 
where Cross had been held for sixty days. The police decided to arrest two of the kidnappers 
as they emerged from the building, then cut off the electricity and began a siege. The remaining 
kidnappers threw out a note to the police that read: ‘If you try anything at all (gas, gunfire, etc.) 
Mr J. Cross will be the first to die. We have several sticks of ‘detonator’ dynamite (powerfrac). 
If you want to negotiate send us a reporter from the Quebec Press or Le Devoir...’ The terrorists 
attempted to bargain for the release of all the 23 FLQ terrorists, but the Ottawa government 
now focused firmly on an offer of safe passage for the kidnappers only.62 
 
On 3 December, London was told that Cross was still alive, and members of the Cuban embassy 
were now involved in ‘operations’.63 After prolonged bargaining, the kidnappers and their 
hostage were moved to the Canadian pavilion of the Montreal ‘Expo 67’ exhibition which was 
temporary declared a Cuban consulate for the hand-over of Cross. A compromise was reached 
and seven people were flown to Cuba. Horrified by the Spartan life-style they encountered in 
Havana, the FLQ party soon moved to France where they gained political asylum.64 Cross 
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returned to London where he was keen to tell his story to the press. Newspapers such as the 
Toronto Star were offering him up to $200,000 for his story.65 However, the Foreign Office 
had already consulted the Cabinet Office and ‘a firm veto was in place’. 66   
 
Reflecting on the Cross case, senior British officials noted that there had been remarkable 
consistency across the Labour and Conservative governments. The previous Harold Wilson 
government, observing the rise in hostage-taking, had agreed on the principle that any 
‘individual kidnapping of a British diplomat would have to be dealt with on a case by case 
basis’. Officials concluded that the new Heath government had taken much same line when 
confronted with a real case. Moreover, there was a similar desire to mix a display of public 
firmness with private flexibility.67 The importance of third parties such as the Algerians and 
the Cubans had been underlined. They also came away from this event with a more nuanced 
appreciation of the range of terrorist groups, some of whom had the capacity for ordered 
bargaining, while others were random and volatile. They placed the FLQ firmly in the latter 
category, describing them as ‘a bunch of youthful psycho-paths’ whose communiques 
combined ‘turgid revolutionary jargon’ with ‘sheer blood-lust’.68 
 
 
Sir Geoffrey Jackson, 1971 
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On 8 January 1971, Sir Geoffrey Jackson, Britain’s ambassador to Uruguay was taken captive 
in Montevideo by a terrorist group called the Tupamaros. His ambassadorial Daimler was 
rammed by a red lorry five hundred yards from the embassy. Half a dozen men with 
submachine guns surrounded the Daimler and then injected him with tranquilizers before he 
was spirited away.69 At the time, the Uruguayan government were fighting to repress popular 
uprisings and, in particular, labour unrest by imprisoning political dissidents and oppressing 
anti-government demonstrations.70 One group in particular, the left-wing Tupamaros National 
Liberation Movement, began life as an opposition group, but soon evolved into urban terrorists, 
willing to use violence both as a means to fund their operations but also to achieve social 
reform. Beginning with armed robberies, the group soon shifted to the more lucrative business 
of kidnapping. After securing $250,000 for the release of Brazilian consul Aloysio Dias 
Gomide who they kidnapped six months before, the Tupamaros had now turned their attention 
to what they believed would be a greater prize.  
 
As weeks turned to months, officials in London became increasingly desperate to locate 
Jackson.71 Some four months after his disappearance, diplomats at the British embassy in 
Uruguay established communications with the Tupamaros through a trusted third party. On 6 
May, they finally reported that: ‘Our contact returned yesterday with his Tupamaro contact’. 
Their intermediary explained that the Tupamaros were willing to release Jackson for one and 
a half million dollars because ‘they need the money’. He produced two recent photos of Jackson 
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as his bona fides. Jackson’s British colleagues in Montevideo urged their superiors in London 
to pay up through a proxy, arguing that, ‘assuming a credible private approach could be 
arranged we might, at worst, be conned for a million, at best, we should obtain Jackson’s 
release’.72 
 
Douglas-Home, the Foreign Secretary, demanded a higher level of reassurance and a lower 
price. To facilitate this, he asked the President of Chile, Salvador Allende, to act as an 
intermediary. As the only avowed Marxist leader in the region, he carried considerable weight 
with the Tupamaros. In late May, Douglas-Home explained to his Cabinet colleagues that, at 
‘our suggestion’, Allende had contacted the Tupamaros and, in ‘reply to his secret approach’, 
they had agreed to let Jackson go in return for ‘a secret payment by HMG [Her Majesty’s 
Government] of ransom in the sum of US $1 million’, publicity for the Allende intervention 
and smaller public payment of £10,000 to a charity ‘for the purpose of saving the Tupamaros’ 
face’. While Douglas-Home insisted that there should not be any ‘wavering in our policy of 
not yielding to blackmail’, nevertheless he was content with a smaller payment to a charity 
‘provided that HMG are not seen to be involved’. Matters were made more complex by the fact 
that reportedly Hugh O'Shaughnessy, Britain’s leading specialist journalist on Latin America, 
then working for the Financial Times, had made contact with the Tupamaros separately and 
was trying to raise the $1 million from private sources. Douglas-Home told Cabinet that he was 
being ‘warned off’ for fear that he might prejudice the success of what he called the government 
‘initiative’.73 The Foreign Secretary had clearly softened his position on deals, but his approach 
also combined carrot and stick. Officials explained that the Information Research Department, 
a covert propaganda unit, was being used against the Tupamaros, adding ‘we are launching a 
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covert campaign of disinformation aimed at causing doubts among them about the contributing 
value to them of holding Geoffrey Jackson’.74 
 
By mid-June 1971, the Earl Jellicoe, the Cabinet Minister in charge of the Civil Service, was 
lamenting that almost six months had passed since Jackson had been kidnapped and that ‘we 
can unfortunately not foresee when he will be released’.75 However, by 26 July 1971, Douglas-
Home was able to assure Heath that the intercession of Allende, ‘provides the most hopeful 
opportunity yet of securing Mr Jackson’s release’ adding that ‘we ought therefore to be ready 
in case it is successful’. Douglas-Home knew an outline deal had already been negotiated and 
he added confidently that ‘even if Mr Jackson’s release from captivity is postponed’, all was 
going well.76 As with the James Cross case and the Leila Khaled case, Denis Greenhill, his 
Permanent Under-Secretary, managed the case personally.77  
 
The final deal had been struck at the Presidential Palace in Chile. Tim Hildyard, the British 
ambassador in Santiago had been allowed to meet Allende's Uruguayan contact in a ‘dark 
room’ there, but noticed that this shadowy figure did not have a Uruguayan accent. Hildyard 
voiced his suspicions that Allende was rather closer to the Tupamaros than they imagined.78 
Either way, British officials noted that the latest Tupamaros offer was approaching an ‘area of 
negotiability’ since they had ‘scaled down their demand from one million dollars to one 
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hundred thousand dollars’ and were ‘prepared to keep the money side covert’.79 Greenhill 
responded: ‘I believe the time has come to pay this comparatively modest “ransom” ... It 
breaches principle but it must not be forgotten that the Leila Khaled case did also.’80 
 
Douglas-Home remained uncomfortable about doing a deal. Anxious to preserve some degree 
of deniability, he was keen to introduce proxies, however implausible they might be: ‘HMG 
were not ready to pay ransom’ he said. ‘However’ he added ‘Mr Jackson’s friends might be 
ready to make a donation, for example to a charitable institution’ in Uruguay, if this would lead 
to the ambassador’s release.81 Edward Heath was more impatient and officials recorded: ‘On 2 
July, the Prime Minister agreed that we should be ready to provide a sum of money, later 
confirmed at $100,000, in connection with Mr Jackson’s release’.82 With negotiations moving 
to an advanced stage, Hildyard in Santiago reported that Allende ‘thought that in this stage of 
the operation it would be best for the representative to have direct talks with me’.83 Allende 
explained to the British that he had viewed all this as an opportunity to put both himself and 
the Latin American left in a good light.84 Heath was pleased with the outcome and urged that 
a knighthood and compensation be in place ready for Jackson’s expected release.85  
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On 9 September 1971, Geoffrey Jackson was released after eight months in captivity. The 
Tupamaros were well rewarded for their kidnap operation. Details of the ransom payment were 
kept secret at the time and the terrorists initially played along with London’s desire to keep the 
details of the Jackson deal secret. Meanwhile, a significant number of Tupamaros mysteriously 
escaped from two jails. The Tupamaros issued a statement claiming simply ‘it was no longer 
necessary for them to hold him following the escape of 106 Tupamaros from jail early on 
Monday’.86 But they could hardly contain their delight at their multiple successes, adding that 
there was no need to detain Jackson now because ‘they had won their fight for political 
prisoners’.87 
 
Jackson’s personal account was rather ambiguous.  At a subsequent press conference, Jackson 
maintained the official line, insisting that states must show that ‘the business of ambassador 
kidnapping is self-defeating’ and that the policy of no rewards should be held firm. But in the 
same breath, he conceded that the Tupamaros had moved into ‘the diplomatic world of 
negotiations’ with some success.88  Information officers did what they could to cover the trail. 
Reflecting on the episode somewhat later, they felt that Sir Geoffrey Jackson had done ‘a good 
job on radio and TV’ when telling his story, but were advised to say as little as possible and to 
‘shy away’ from further questions.89   
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The British government seemed to have a notional price limit for Jackson. They were happier 
to facilitate larger sums for the return of British businessmen, if the employer was willing to 
foot the bill. Some of these amounts were remarkable. In parallel with the Geoffrey Jackson 
affair, the Foreign Office was dealing with the kidnapping of Ronald Grove, the general 
manager of Britain’s considerable Vestey business empire in Argentina by the communist 
People’s Revolutionary Army or ‘ERP’ terrorist group. The ERP had recently kidnapped Dutch 
manager of Philipps and had killed Italian manager of the Fiat plant when the police stumbled 
on their hideout. Lord Vestey, who managed the matter personally, wanted the Foreign Office 
to take part in negotiations for the release of his employee.90 Vestey agreed to a price of 
$500,000 in dollar notes and $500,000 in pesos notes. British officials observed that: 'Dollars 
on this scale were not available in Argentina even on the black market'. Vestey asked for British 
government help in securing the cash and suggested the money ‘be brought in in sacks under 
diplomatic privilege’, but the Foreign Office rejected the idea.91 Instead, the Foreign Office 
secured government approval for the money to be taken by rather nervous couriers from 
Gatwick. Ronald Gove was soon released.92 
 
 
Charles Lockwood 1973 
On 6 June 1973, a splinter group of the same ‘ERP’ terrorist group kidnapped Charles 
Lockwood on his way to his office in Buenos Aires. Lockwood was a successful Anglo-
Argentine financier who served on the board of Roberts Finance Co., an affiliate of Acrow 
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Steel which at the time, represented many British and American interests in Argentina. The 
group initially demanded $7.5 million in ransom payment.93 Days after the kidnapping, the 
Foreign Office discussed recent surge in terrorist kidnappings in Argentina with the director of 
London based Lloyds & Bolsa International bank. 94 The financiers were despairing of the 
constant kidnappings and argued that the only real hope, ‘lies in a really effective move by the 
Argentine authorities to nab some of these criminals and put them to death – to discourage 
others’. Improbably, they also recommended that the Argentine authorities compensate any 
financial loss encountered by companies forced to pay ransom in return for their executives. In 
contrast to current British policy that forbids any engagement by British companies with 
proscribed terrorist groups, it appears to have been common practice in the 1970s for the 
government to encourage and assist companies to directly negotiate with terrorists. 95  
 
Unlike the Jackson case, talks took place immediately. On 7 June, one day after the kidnapping, 
the British embassy in Buenos Aires reported: ‘Negotiations are proceeding’.96 The main 
contact was between the employers and the kidnappers. On 26 June 1973, hopes seemed to be 
fading because the kidnappers had not been in touch with the company for over a week.97 But 
on 30 July 1973, fifty-seven days after he was originally taken, Charles Lockwood was released 
unharmed by his captors. The media widely reported that a ransom of $1 million had been paid, 
but this was an underestimate.98 Later that year, the Foreign Office’s Latin America department 
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conducted a security analysis of Argentina. They noted that five Britons had been taken by the 
People’s Revolutionary Army between May 1971 and September 1973, adding that, ‘victims 
have not generally been harmed because ransoms have usually been paid sooner or later’. In 
three of the five cases, a ransom was negotiated for the safe release of the hostage, adding that 
Charles Lockwood, ‘was released for a ransom of US $2 million’.99  Lockwood possibly holds 
the record for sums paid for a British hostage, he was ransomed for $2 million in 1973 and 
again for $10 million in 1975, after which he wisely chose to leave Argentina, but there may 
be other cases as yet unknown.  
 
Detecting exactly when this British policy of flexibility stiffened is difficult. Public professions 
of robustness are easy to find - but were not incompatible with private negotiation. In late 1978, 
when Lord Kenner asked Prime Minister James Callaghan whether the government would 
undertake not to yield to terrorist blackmail he received a firm reply.100 Margaret Thatcher 
certainly adopted a tough public stance during the 1980 Iranian Embassy Hostage Siege. 
However, Thatcher’s policy was quietly adapted to accommodate the United States. British 
officials were at the least facilitators to the American negotiation programme in Beirut run by 
Oliver North. 101 Moreover, Britain’s approach to kidnap and ransom insurance suggests that 
flexibility may have persisted for longer than we have hitherto suspected. 
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British policy on kidnap and ransom insurance 
The further development Britain’s policy on kidnap and ransom insurance was complex 
because it was partly the creation of a state-private network. A private company run by former 
military personnel, together with specialist insurance brokers, helped to persuade government 
to pursue an ambiguous policy on kidnapping and ransom insurance during the 1980s and 
1990s. In 2000, Britain introduced legislation which appeared to make paying a ransom 
synonymous with financing terrorism. However, because this law only applied within the 
British jurisdiction, underwriters were free to offer kidnap and ransom policies to companies 
operating overseas and so London remained the centre of this market. In 2015, the Counter 
Terrorism and Security Act, finally made it a criminal offence for any British-based insurance 
company to reimburse money or property, ‘that has been, or is to be, handed over in response 
to a demand made wholly or partly for the purposes of terrorism’.102 Ministers explained that 
such insurance created an environment conducive to the payment of ransom demands.103 
Accordingly, for some forty years, between 1975 and 2015, London was a growing centre of  
specialist anti-kidnap expertise that often resided in what are now called private military 
companies or PMCs.  
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Britain appears to have invented kidnap and ransom insurance.104 It is likely that the first 
‘K&R’ policy was issued in London in 1933 following the famous Lindbergh kidnapping case. 
Demand grew rapidly during the 1970s because of the rise in kidnapping incidents and by 1984, 
Lloyds of London, controlled over 75% of a substantial market.105 In the late 1970s, the Italians 
and later the Germans proposed a ban on such insurance. However, the British government, 
liaising with the American FBI, rejected the suggestion and consequently sought to undermine 
the European initiative by having discussions transferred from the EEC Commission to a 
‘TREVI’ working group. This was because Britain was a lead element in the TREVI counter-
terrorism forum and so their objections were likely to carry more weight here.106 Standing firm 
against the initiative, British ministers claimed that, responsibly conducted, kidnap insurance 
was helpful to the authorities and therefore ought not to be discouraged. They argued that 
insurance companies typically used professional security consultants to audit the security 
procedures of the policy holder, thereby reducing the risk of kidnap in the first place.107 
 
But beneath the surface, British policy on ransom insurance was in disarray due to divergent 
departmental interests. In November 1977, Lord Harris, Minister of State at the Home Office 
met with Stanley Clinton-Davies, Minister for Aviation and Shipping. While deprecating the 
Franco-German proposal for a ban, they privately conceded that the Foreign Office also 
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discouraged kidnap and ransom insurance because its Security Department believed ‘such 
policies do encourage kidnapping’.108 The main underwriters for these policies at the time, 
Lloyds of London, confidentially estimated the market’s value to them at £50 million per annum 
and pressed for its continuation.109 Therefore, on the one hand, trade and industry ministers 
sought to protect Lloyds of London with whom they enjoyed a good working relationship, while 
on the other hand, security experts with the Foreign Office who worked to protect diplomats 
were keen for a ban, partly because of a growing spate of kidnappings by the IRA.  
 
In 1983, the Chief Executive of Associated British Foods Ltd, Don Tidey, was kidnapped for 
ransom in Dublin by the IRA with an initial demand for US $7 million. The Irish Taoiseach, 
Garret Fitzgerald, had information that the company were willing to pay US$ 2 million into a 
Swiss bank account to secure Tidey’s release and asked Margaret Thatcher to intervene. ‘It is 
vital to both our governments that this money not be paid. Can you help in any way to ensure 
this?’ Thatcher felt no less strongly, asserting ‘that it is vital that a ransom should not be paid 
in a kidnapping case’ and replied ‘we will do all we can to hold the company to it’.110 Tidey 
was eventually freed after a vicious gun battle, but thereafter the company reportedly paid 
sizeable protection to the IRA to prevent further kidnaps.111 As a result of this episode, the Irish 
Attorney General persuaded Margaret Thatcher to reconsider its position on kidnap 
insurance.112 Recognising the shift in Irish terrorism towards kidnapping businessmen, Sir 
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Robert Armstrong, the Cabinet Secretary, suggested they should ‘approach such a policy 
review with an open mind’.113  
 
Proponents of the ban insisted it was, ‘illogical for the government to take a firm line against 
conceding to terrorist demands, including the payment of ransom’, and yet to give its ‘seal of 
approval to the availability of insurance designed to reimburse those who do pay’.114 Yet 
privately, British ministers and civil servants continued to express concerns over the possible 
impact such a ban might have on the insurance industry. In April 1984, in preparation for 
discussions on this at a major economic summit in London, Roy Harrington, who ran the 
counter-terrorism division of the Home Office wrote to Armstrong emphasising that ‘we have 
a major economic interest in seeing this business continue’.115 Harrington summed up the 
Home Office position by insisting, ‘there is no UK interest in raising this subject’, because, 
‘there is no information to suggest that kidnap insurance is either an important source of funds 
for terrorists, or a threat to the common objectives of government to resist terrorism’.116  
 
Underpinning this view was a close public-private partnership between the government, private 
security firms and the insurance market. This included a specialist company called Control 
Risks Group Ltd, created in 1975. Control Risks was initially formed as a subsidiary of 
insurance broker Hogg Robinson, to minimize their exposure to kidnap and ransom claims. 
This was done partly by using ex-military personnel to vet the security arrangements of the 
insured companies. At this point, the core of the business consisted of crisis management and 
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incident response specialists, often with a military background. During the early 1980s, the 
company became independent following a management buy-out and expanded into political 
and security risk analysis, often employing academic area studies experts to write in-depth 
country reports. By the 1990s they had operated in over 100 countries.117 At the same time, the 
British government was expanding its use of another private security company, Keenie Meenie 
Services (KMS), which used former Special Air Service personnel to inspect and protect high 
risk embassy locations in Africa and the Middle East. KMS was itself an earlier offshoot of 
Control Risks Group created in 1977.118   
 
Control Risks Group argued consistently that, of those kidnapped, less than 5% were insured. 
Where ransoms were paid, those particular cases managed by Lloyds and Control Risks Group 
were usually a third of the sum initially demanded. Banning ransom insurance, they insisted, 
would simply force potential victims to go to less well organised overseas insurance companies 
that did not insist on the involvement of specialists to improve security standards and that paid 
out more readily.119 While unapologetically protecting the kidnap insurance market to the 
frustration of fellow EC member states, Thatcher’s government were nevertheless, particularly 
keen to confiscate funds gained from any such terrorist activities. In 1985, Home Secretary, 
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Douglas Hurd, began devising legislation that would eventually allow the British government 
to seize the proceeds of any successful kidnap and ransom incident held in British banks.120  
 
In the spring of 1986, to the dismay of Home Office officials, the subject of kidnap insurance 
reared its head again. The Dublin government suspected that British firms were paying large 
sums to IRA as protection against kidnapping. In the House of Commons, John Biffen, 
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, was asked about a company executive who was found 
at Dublin airport with £300,000 in his suitcase. Some MPs suspected this was connected to 
operations advised by the Control Risks Group.121 By this point, British officials had 
intelligence suggesting that a number of businessmen ‘may be paying protection money on a 
large scale as a result of threats for the provisional IRA'. 122 At the same time, a member of the 
Guinness family was abducted and then released by gunmen after being held a week for a $2.5 
million ransom. In Parliament, John Hume, leader of the mainly Catholic SDLP focused his 
criticism on Control Risks. The company stoutly defended its reputation, explaining that it had 
advised negotiators faced with a total of $697 million in ransom demands and had succeeded 
in reducing the total paid out to $109 million. But some MPs called on the Attorney General 
Sir Michael Havers to prosecute Control Risks, together with Cassidy Davis Ltd., Lloyd's 
leading underwriter of kidnap and ransom insurance, for breach of the Prevention of Terrorism 
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Act. Meanwhile, the Dublin government recognised that this was a Europe-wide problem and 
initiated new high-level discussions focused on the possibility of curbing ransom payments.123 
 
On 28 April, the Home Secretary Douglas Hurd travelled to The Hague to attend a ministerial-
level meeting of the TREVI group, the European forum for counter-terrorism co-operation.124 
Because the Irish government were suspicious of the activities of Control Risks, they raised 
the matter directly at this meeting.125 Hurd also had 'strong feelings on the matter' and returned 
determined to do something about kidnap and ransom insurance.126 He argued that while it was 
reasonable to take out insurance against theft, this sort of insurance often involved negotiation 
with the terrorists and therefore constituted something more sinister.127 Privately, officials 
accepted that some of the claims made in the sales literature of Control Risks about 
reimbursement of ransoms were rather alarming and added that they ‘must involve a 
contravention’ of the Prevention of Terrorism Act. The Northern Ireland Office was worried 
that what they were uncovering about the company looked like 'conspiracy to breach sections 
10 or 11’ of the act. They also felt that the insurers who worked with them might be liable to a 
charge of aiding and abetting the same offence.128 But although a cross-Whitehall working 
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party deliberated for many months, they were reluctant to move against ransom insurance, 
observing that the matter needed ‘considerable thought’.129 
 
This was partly because the Control Risks Group were well organised and well-connected. 
Christopher Soames, the chairman of their Advisory Board, was an effective lobbyist. 
Previously a Cabinet Minister under Harold Macmillan, Ambassador to Paris, EEC 
Commissioner for Trade and then leader of the House of Lords, Soames was also Winston 
Churchill’s son-in-law and carried considerable influence. He enjoyed a close friendship with 
many in the Thatcher cabinet, including Lord Carrington. Nicknamed ‘Fatty Soames’, he was 
a large and boisterous figure renowned for his talents of persuasion and diplomacy.130 He asked 
to meet personally with Hurd, bringing the Chairman and Director with him, a request to which 
his officials readily agreed.131 Hurd was also lobbied repeatedly by Robert McCrindle MP who 
was an insurance broker and a parliamentary consultant to the insurance industry.132 ‘The 
insurance industry is engaged in a major lobbying campaign', noted Hurd’s private secretary, 
and were bombarding him with long briefing documents. But, he added, the Home Secretary 
‘feels strongly that kidnap ransom insurance is an objectionable business’ and officials thought 
that he would 'not be convinced' by the entreaties of Soames and McCrindle.133 
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In fact, Hurd’s most formidable opponent was the United States.  In May 1986, Hurd met with 
Ed Meese, the US Attorney General and a range of other officials including William Webster, 
Director of the FBI and Admiral Poindexter, Reagan’s National Security Adviser. Webster was 
not keen on an insurance ban. The FBI was anxious to create a climate in which the family of 
the victim would readily approach them for guidance. Outside the USA, American corporations 
'often saw ransom as a business risk which they had to bear'. All clearly felt that a ban on 
insurance was an inhibition to early contact with law enforcement. Instead, Meese undertook 
to look at freezing terrorist assets, but did not like the idea that government might 'find itself 
in the difficult position of having caused the death of the victim’.134 Hurd had hoped for US 
support, but came away from his visit disappointed, realising that in the short-term the freezing 
of terrorist funds was the only way forward.135 
 
Hurd’s officials were visibly cheered by the American position, since they saw the whole 
matter as simply too difficult to tackle. Roy Harrington, who headed the inter-departmental 
review, now drafted recommendations on ransom insurance for the Cabinet Committee on 
Terrorism, although he was ‘by no means confident’ that Hurd would accept them. 
Harrington’s proposal was to ‘to do nothing’ unless an emergency made it absolutely 
necessary. He argued that any legislation that addressed the IRA problem by banning insurance 
would mean that many British companies might have difficulty recruiting staff to work in high-
risk areas like South America if, as a result, insurance cover against kidnapping was not 
available. Moreover, when dealing with specific ransom cases, they feared they would lose the 
co-operation of the families of the victims.  
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In this country ... there is a great risk of a collapse of resistance and an immediate 
secret payment by an uninsured victim than an insured victim whose insurers are 
very likely to succeed in making him play for time. While the Governments' interest 
and those of Control Risks are not identical, they do overlap. The difference may 
be summarised crudely by saying that Control Risks and the insurers might settle 
for 10% of the demands: we would only settle for 0%. 
 
Ultimately, the Home Office knew that Control Risks could transfer their entire business 
abroad and so preferred to keep them in London where they could exercise some influence over 
them. They also valued Control Risks as an informal source of intelligence on terrorism. 
Therefore, officials chose the path of accommodation. If pressed further, their plan was to opt 
for greater powers to freeze terrorist funds, but not to act against insurers or negotiators. This 
would allow them to deal with embarrassing local cases where protection money seemed to be 
going to the IRA, but would leave insurers free to operate in a global market.136 Meanwhile, 
the British government reached an informal agreement to insert a Criminal Acts Exclusion 
Clause into all future insurance policies. This ensured that if ever the threat from domestic 
kidnapping grew and the government needed to act to make the payment of ransoms illegal, 
the insurance policies would not pay out. In effect, this gave government the option of a future 
veto on existing policies if it wished to exercise it.137 
 
In short, what the British government were seeking, and indeed obtained until 2015 was the 
ability to have their cake and eat it. Domestically, what they wanted was for any new case to 
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be disclosed to the government and the police so that the authorities had the option of 
participating directly in its handling. These assurances were extracted in return for continued 
toleration. Outside Britain, they actually thought the 'involvement of experienced advisers’ 
who could support the victims at a time of acute psychological and emotional pressures was 
helpful since the government itself 'could not take responsibility of handling cases outside UK 
jurisdiction’. In other words, Control Risks were fulfilling a difficult global security role that 
the British government preferred to leave to proxies and privateers.138 Together with its 
extensive use of KMS for diplomatic protection, this British policy appears to have contributed 
to the rise of some of the first private military companies, albeit they were small by current 
standards.  
 
Remarkably, by 1986, officials had also anticipated the position to which they would 
eventually have to retreat to over a decade later, namely making the payment of ransom illegal 
on a national basis only. Again, this addressed the awkward issue of domestic payments to 
groups like the IRA, but left Control Risks and the insurers free to carry out their overseas 
business. Officials observed that, having read the Lloyds briefing papers, most kidnap and 
ransom insurance business was in respect of cover for third world countries, and they realised 
that by leaving this alone there would be ‘fewer howls ... of anguish from the industry'.139 
Ultimately, this was the position that Britain adopted in 2000 and during the next decade the 
kidnap and ransom insurance market often grew at an impressive 15-20% per year.140  
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Conclusions 
In 2016, David Cameron attended a major NATO summit hosted in Wales.141 With ISIS 
holding only British and American citizens - having released the French, Spanish, Germans 
and Italians - Cameron somewhat meekly reminded fellow NATO members of previous public 
commitments they had made not to concede and pay terrorist ransoms.142 Yet he was probably 
unaware of how much Britain’s own policy had varied over previous decades. Publicly, Britain 
claims to have taken a historic hard line in respect of hostage negotiation and ransom payments, 
yet privately there have been conflicting voices. Indeed, Britain has only pursued a really 
consistent policy on kidnap and ransom insurance since 2015. Up until that point, officials 
pursued a flexible policy, acting against payments to the IRA, but facilitating insurance against 
extortion by South American terrorists or drug gangs.   
 
This is still a story in the shadows, since much archival material remains beyond the reach of 
researchers. So, do a handful of extant historical examples matter much? What is most striking 
about the cases discussed here is the consistent efforts of officials to keep negotiation secret 
and to maintain the illusion of a hard line for the benefit of the public and the press. For 
terrorism researchers who rely on databases driven by press material this raises interesting 
questions. On specific issues where governments wish to dissemble, such as state-sponsorship 
of violent non-state actors, or kidnap for ransom, how reliable are these databases? Historians 
have documented the extensive efforts of governments to shape public narratives and press 
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reporting in recent decades, but the extent to which this has impacted upon terrorism research  
requires more extensive exploration.143 
 
These episodes also shed light on the importance of interstate co-operation and third-party 
facilitators of negotiation. Canada’s Prime Minister, Pierre Trudeau wrote personally to Fidel 
Castro to thank him for helping with 'the arrangements' that led to the release of James Cross, 
and a few years later became the first NATO leader to visit Cuba, to the dismay of the United 
States.144 Salvador Allende’s successful efforts to release Jackson were similarly appreciated 
by Edward Heath. Some traction within the state system, if only as a place of refuge, added to 
terrorist credibility during negotiations. By contrast, more anarchistic groups, such as that led 
by ‘Carlos the Jackal’, were eventually shunned by all but the most maverick of states.145   
 
The British response to kidnapping and diplomatic protection was to promote state-private 
networks developed by former special forces operatives. This helped to lay the foundation for 
the modern private security industry - which is now immense.146 Control Risks now boasts 
offices in some 36 countries and has had many subsequent emulators. Finally, all these events 
cast a long shadow and the files suggest that, when faced with difficult decisions on terrorism, 
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policy-makers often used past cases and historical analogies to help them make sense of current 
options. This persistence of memory is all the more reason that we should devote more effort 
to probing the documentary record.147  Perhaps the time has come for a more generous release 
of historical materials and, thereafter, a fresh examination of both approaches and outcomes 
regarding terrorist kidnap and ransom.  
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